In order to assess the reasons for and against introducing a principle of universalization for solving moral conflicts, let us begin by sketching briefly the basic assumptions shared by the Kantian and Hobbesian traditions of social-contract theories, as well as those that divide them. All social-contract theories share the assumption (1) that questions of justice arise when there is a conflict of interest between different people, and the claim (2) that a rational answer to questions of justice is one on which all possibly affected could reach a rational agreement. This claim is the normative core of the otherwise metaphorical idea of a social contract. Of course, the cogency of the contractualist idea of rational agreement turns on two further assumptions, namely, (3) that all parties to the agreement share an interest in solving their conflict by rational means, and (4) that making the resolution dependent on their rational agreement guarantees that the interests of all will be taken into consideration. It is by virtue of the last assumption that any specific version of contractualism can plausibly claim to provide an answer to the question of what justice requires, that is, to draw a normative line between just and unjust resolutions to social conflicts.
However, these minimal assumptions are obviously insufficient to distinguish between Kantian and Hobbesian versions of contractualism, for, although both versions consider rational agreement to be a condition for justice, there is nothing in the assumptions mentioned so far that would support the presumption of universality characteristic of Kantian contractualism. namely, that all such agreements would have to have identical outcomes in order to be just. In fact, the opposite conclusion seems more plausible: if one assumes that, beyond the shared interest in a rational resolution of their conflict, all other interests of the affected parties differ or, even worse, are essentially in opposition, as assumption (1) may suggest, the outcome of each agreement would essentially depend on what happen to be the interests of those affected in each case as well as on their relative willingness to compromise some of them for the sake of reaching agreement. No matter how strict the conditions for the fairness of the procedure were to be set up, the essential differences in the make-up of the participants would necessarily be reflected in different outcomes of their agreements.
Thus, the assumption that moral questions have "single right answers" characteristic of the moral cognitivism that Kantian versions of contractualism defend seems to depend on assuming that the interest in the rational resolution of conflict is not the only interest that all affected parties have in common. It is further assumed (5) that they share those basic interests and needs that are necessary to sustain their lives as rational beings. And it is in virtue of the homogeneity of their basic interests as human beings that the outcomes of their possible agreements can be expected to be homogeneous as well: norms that protect those interests for all human beings are just, whereas those incompatible with such protection are unjust. Only under this further assumption does the basic claim of contractualism acquire the egalitarian sense characteristic of its Kantian versions. In a Kantian framework, the claim that rational agreement among all affected parties guarantees that the interests of all will be taken into consideration does not mean merely that all conflicting interests will be balanced against each other in order to reach a feasible compromise, as in a Hobbesian framework. Instead, it specifically means that of all the interests the different parties may have, those that they cannot fail to share because they are necessary to sustain their lives as rational beings will be equally protected by the norms agreed upon. 5 It is the assumption of uni-versally shared interests and needs that in turn gives prima facie plausibility to the claim that questions of justice can be answered by a procedure that will yield single answers (like Kant's categorical imperative, Rawls's original position, Habermas's principle of universalization, etc.). The claim of objectivity of Kantian contractualism turns on this assumption, which constitutes the differentia specifica with the non-cognitivism of the Hobbesian versions. Those defending the latter versions genuinely disagree with this assumption by claiming that there is no such thing as the generalizable interests shared by all rational human beings, for what is rational for human beings to will essentially depends on the actual desires they have to begin with, and those, far from being shared, are actually in opposition. 6 Thus, whereas the Kantian moral cognitivist is committed to the existence of an overlap among those interests that are unrenounceable for any rational human being, the non-cognitivist questions the existence of such overlap. This in turn explains why the non-cognitivist can only take an empirical stance vis-a-vis whatever interests and preferences human beings happen to have (for they are intrinsically arbitrary, according to this view), whereas the Kantian cognitivist can take a normative stance vis-a-vis these interests and distinguish those that are generalizable and thus legitimate from those that are not. Accordingly, the assumption of "generalizable interests" among all human beings explains both why, according to Kantian moral theories, something like a principle of universalization is possible at all and, more importantly in our context, why compromise or bargaining are unacceptable solutions to moral problems when those interests are at issue. This assumption, though, does not seem to be a merely idiosyncratic stipulation of Kantian moral theories such as discourse ethics, as Heath suggests. I think that Heath would agree that whereas "flipping a coin" can be seen as a paradigmatically fair procedure for solving the bargaining problem of "who gets to keep a contested commodity" (p. 245), it could hardly count as a paradigmatically morally valid procedure for solving problems such as who gets to vote, to be killed, raped, or executed, to give some examples. Of course, the interesting question here is how to explain why this is so.
On the one hand, Heath's criticisms of the assumption of "generalizable interests" that underlies Habermas's principle of universalization suggest that he shares the Hobbesian suspicion that, in cases of conflict, the interests of the parties are essentially in opposition, and thus that the only interest they share is to solve the conflict by rational means (e.g., pp. 233, 243). In fact, one has the impression that, due to a narrow diet of examples (i.e., examples based on the model of economic interactions characteristic of rational-choice theories), Heath conceives of "the vast majority of moral disputes" (p. 245) on the model of a zero-sum game, i.e., a game in which none can gain unless the other loses. It is certainly uncontroversial to claim that conflicts of this type are the paradigmatic cases that call for compromises, even fair compromises. But it is surely controversial to claim that they are the paradigmatic cases of moral conflicts. In any event, following this line of thinking would make it hard to explain why under normal circumstances compromises are not acceptable solutions to moral conflicts like the ones mentioned before.
On the other hand, at several points in his argument, Heath himself concedes that not all compromises that would satisfy the common interest of the parties to solve their conflict rationally would be "just" or valid "from the moral point of view" (e.g., pp. 232,244). Here, however, Heath does not seem to realize that after he has called into question Habermas's own interpretation of the moral point of view in terms of the principle of universalization, he can no longer appeal to such a point of view without first offering an alternative account of what it consists in. Here is, of course, the interesting question of whether such an explanation could even be possible without anything resembling the distinction between generalizable and particular interests (or some functional equivalent to it). Let us see why.
According to discourse ethics, to adopt the moral point of view consists in asking the question of what is equally in the interest of all. As already mentioned, this question can have a positive answer only if some things can literally be equally in the interest of all. This is why, in order to defend that particular interpretation of the moral point of view, the principle of universalization assumes that there are "generalizable interests" among all human beings and thus that moral questions can have "single right answers": norms that protect those interests for all human beings are just, whereas those incompatible with such protection are unjust. However problematic this Kantian approach may be, at least it provides a straightforward answer to the question of what are acceptable solutions to such conflicts from a moral point of view. According to the principle of universalization, what it takes for a participant to defend the claim that a norm is not merely good for some people and bad for others, but just or unjust for anyone (in the circumstances to which the norm applies, of course), is to show that the interest that the norm protects is one that even those who disagree could not fail to have if they were in the circumstances to which the norms applies. It is because the interest in not being killed is an interest that even killers could not fail to have if they were in the circumstances to which the norm applies that a norm prohibiting murder is morally right or just. By contrast, a conflict among particular interests of particular people has a different structure and thus does not require a universally valid answer. Although this distinction may be hard to draw in specific cases, there is luckily a paradigmatic type of conflict whose very structure already indicates that it belongs in the latter group, namely, conflicts with the structure of a zero-sum game. To claim that in a given conflict none can gain unless another loses is tantamount to claiming that the conflicting interests among the parties are not generalizable. Therefore, whenever a conflict has this structure, its solution can be at most a better or worse compromise, but it does not have a universally valid answer from a moral point of view. ' We can see that a Kantian approach has a prima facie plausible answer to the question of what distinguishes the two different types of cases mentioned above. Assuming that none of the parties to the conflict has more of a right than any other to a "contested commodity," "flipping a coin" can be seen as a paradigmatically fair procedure to solve that kind of conflict. But precisely because we assume (and to the extent that we can do so) that, between the interest in killing and the interest in not being killed, only the latter is generalizable, flipping a coin is not a morally acceptable solution to a conflict of this kind.
In this context it is perhaps important to prevent a possible misunderstanding. In a Hobbesian spirit, it may seem possible to interpret all conflicts of interest on the model of a zero-sum game. For the very assumption that there is a conflict of interest among the parties implies that not all of them can gain. Thus, whatever the solution may be, one of the parties can gain only if the other loses, otherwise there would not be a need for a norm regulating the conflict in the first place. In this spirit, the norm that prohibits murder could be seen as a solution to the conflict of interests between killers and victims in which the victims satisfy their interest in not being killed at the expense of the killers' interest in killing. So viewed, it seems impossible to resolve it by finding a shared interest among killers and victims, let alone a generalizable one. However, it should be obvious that such an interpretation is fallacious. As long as killers have as much of an interest in not being killed as any victims do, such an interest is generalizable, whereas the interest in killing is not. Therefore, the former interest trumps the latter, for everyone gains, killers included, from the norm that protects them from being killed, whereas not everyone could gain in the absence of such norm. Thus, the conflict between killer and victim does not have the structure of a zero-sum game. If anything, it has the structure of a free-rider problem. Now, the question here is whether it is possible to offer an account of what the moral point of view consists in without relying on some version or other of the distinction between generalizable and particular interests (and thus without some version or other of a principle of universalization). My impression is that under the Hobbesian assumption that there is no such thing as generalizable interests shared by all rational human beings, (that is, under the assumption that all human interests are intrinsically arbitrary matters of subjective preferences), it would be hard to avoid the Hobbesian conclusion that compromise is the only solution to practical conflicts, moral or otherwise. And, once this conclusion is reached, it is no longer clear why "to each according to his threat advantage" could not be a valid principle for solving all kinds of practical conflicts. That morality precludes that valid solutions reflect the differences in bargaining power among the participants or that the moral point of view is incompatible with a strategic orientation are claims that Habermas can justify precisely and only on the basis of his principle of universalization.
But, in the absence of any such principle, Heath can no longer get the entitlement to these claims for free by deferring to discourse ethics. An alternative justification of such claims is urgently needed. But this is something that Heath does not provide in his book.
Let us finally take a brief look at a different line of argument that Heath develops against discourse ethics' principle of universalization. Whereas the line of argument discussed so far seems to be based on an external criticism of the principle, namely, on the Hobbesian suspicion that there is no such a thing as generalizable interests among all human beings, at one point Heath suggests a different, internal line of criticism. Here Heath argues against the distinction between "generalizable" and "particular interests" by questioning whether the moral/ethical distinction that is based on it can be consistently maintained within the overall strategy of discourse ethics. He argues as follows: "The distinction between what is good 'for all' and 'for us' . . . is even inconsistent with Habermas's own claim that norms purport to regulate action only among all those affected, not necessarily all persons" (p. 237).
Heath assumes here that, according to the principle of universalization, the validity of norms is restricted to "all those affected" by them and thus it does not require that norms be universally acceptable to everyone. However, this can hardly be a correct interpretation of the principle, for, as we all know, discourse ethics' defence of moral cognitivism entails the claim that moral questions have universally valid answers (i.e., "single right answers") and thus that moral norms are unconditionally valid. Whether this claim is plausible or not is irrelevant here, but from an exegetical point of view it seems indisputable that a central and explicit aim of discourse ethics is to defend the strong commitment to moral cognitivism characteristic of Kantian moral theories. Something must have gone wrong here.
Let us see what it might be.
Heath's interpretation is rooted in Habermas's use of the expression "all possibly affected" in his principle of universalization. Now, there is a fairly straightforward interpretation of the point of including such an expression, which by no means invites Heath's problematic conclusions. The inclusion of this expression surely reflects the restricted scope of application of norms, but this by itself does not imply a restriction of their validity. Habermas's use of the expression "all possibly affected" points first of all to the trivial fact that norms do not apply to individuals in all circumstances, but only in some relevant circumstances (namely, those involved in the kinds of action that the norm addresses). Accordingly, to claim that a norm is morally right if all possibly affected could rationally accept it is just another way of saying that a norm is morally right if it could be ration-ally accepted by everyone in the relevant circumstances. This, of course, rules out the possibility that the norm could be morally right if any individual in the same circumstances would consider it rationally unacceptable, no matter to which community or at what time in history that individual may belong. In other words, from the limited scope of application of norms to particular individuals in particular circumstances, a restriction of the universality of their validity by no means follows. The scope of application of a norm and its validity are two separate issues.
However, according to Heath's reading, the restriction to "all possibly affected" does not concern merely the scope of application of the norm. The claim that "a norm is morally right if all possibly affected could rationally accept it" purports to identify those to whom rational justification is owed. Under this interpretation, it follows that "agents are committed to justifying their norms only to all those affected" (p. 260) and not to everyone who may ask for justification. Therefore, if those affected by a norm in a particular community at a particular time happen to accept it, the possible counterarguments of anyone else could just be ignored by replying "it's none of your business if we choose to do things this way" (ibid.).
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If this reading is correct, it would indeed be hard to see how such a moral principle could support the claim that moral questions have universally valid answers. Unless there is another interpretation of the sense of the restriction, Heath would have certainly identified a major inconsistency in the program of discourse ethics.
Luckily, though, there is an alternative interpretation of the restriction that is straightforwardly Kantian. According to it, the point of Habermas's reference to "the affected persons" in his moral principle is to indicate that we are committed to justify a norm to everyone as possibly affected, that is, to everyone thought of as being in the relevant circumstances (i.e., the circumstances to which the norm applies). This is by no means a restriction in the scope of individuals to whom justification is owed, for, as we know, according to the discursive approach, what counts in favour of a norm is the quality of the arguments that support it, but by no means the identity of those who offer them-it is rather a restriction in the perspective that is relevant for justification. What the reference to the "possibly affected persons" in Habermas's moral principle is meant to do is force the discourse participants to put themselves in the shoes of all of those possibly affected, that is, to offer arguments from the perspective of what things would be like if they were in any of the circumstances to which the norm applies. This is, of course, crucial for ensuring that those who by chance may already know that they will never be in the position of some of those affected by a particular norm nonetheless base their agreement on whether they could accept the consequences of the norm if they were in any of the relevant circumstances to which the norm applies, that is, if they counted among any of those possibly affected by it. The reference to those "possibly affected" in Habermas's moral principle is thus the functional equivalent of the "veil of ignorance" in Rawls's original position. Far from restricting the validity of norms from the moral point of view, it is part of what makes it possible to adopt that point of view in the first place. prudential, ethical, etc.) . In his argument, Heath claims that the moral principle (U) "articulate^] the way that the generic rules of discourse become operationalized when applied to the topic of which norms are valid" (p. 228). However, here Heath gets the "topic" wrong. Obviously, his description applies to the discourse principle (D), but not to the moral principle (U). According to Habermas, the difference between the two is precisely that, whereas the former expresses an unspecific sense of the validity of norms, the latter expresses not just which norms are valid, but which norms are morally valid (i.e., "just," as opposed to "good," "legitimate," "prudential," etc.). On Habermas's distinctions among the discourse, the moral, and the democratic principle, see J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996, pp. 104-31) .
Notes
5 Here it is important to note that in order to get this result it is not sufficient to replace the assumption that the parties are moved by self-interest with the assumption that they are moved by the moral interest in reaching an agreement equally good for all, for, no matter how genuine this interest is supposed to be, if we did not assume that their basic interests and needs actually overlap, there would be literally nothing equally good for all. 6 As a good Hobbesian, Heath shares this assumption. This can be seen clearly in the context of his main criticism of Habermas's principle of universalization, namely, that "the notion of a common interest is, at best, unhelpful" (p. 243). Assuming, as Heath seems to do, that "in principle each persons's interests [are] her own" (ibid.), it surely follows that in cases of conflict "all that agents are going to discover at a higher level of abstraction . . . is that they have an abstract or general interest in compromising" (ibid., p. 233). 7 It should be clear that in this context nothing turns on the "name" we give to each type of conflict. What is at issue here is not the definition of "moral." but ruling out the possibility that solutions to conflicts of the second type should be considered valid for conflicts of the first type as well. It is the need for a sharp distinction between the two cases that characterizes Kantian approaches, regardless of the names one may use to draw the distinction. 8 Although strictly speaking that would not be a valid move even in the context of discourses on ethical questions, according to the Habermasian approach, it is clear that practical discourses focused on the validity of norms from an ethical point of view come closest to what Heath is arguing about here; as long as the counterarguments offered in such discourses were not directed at showing that the norm is immoral (i.e., unjust), but merely that it would not be good for other communities given their different goals, values, etc., one could indeed reply to them, according to the Habermasian approach, that this is just what we, the affected, consider "good for us," given who we are.
